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Constructing an LDPC Code Containing a Given Vector
Sven Mu¨elich1, Sven Puchinger2 and Martin Bossert1
Abstract— The coding problem considered in this work is
to construct a linear code C of given length n and dimension
k < n such that a given binary vector r ∈ Fn2 is contained in
the code. We study a recent solution of this problem by Mu¨elich
and Bossert, which is based on LDPC codes. We address two
open questions of this construction. First, we show that under
certain assumptions, this code construction is possible with high
probability if r is chosen uniformly at random. Second, we
calculate the uncertainty of r given the constructed code C. We
present an application of this problem in the field of Physical
Unclonable Functions (PUFs).
I. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The problem considered in this work is stated as follows:
Problem 1 Given a vector r ∈ Fn2 and a desired dimension
k < n. Find a binary linear code C(n,≈ k) with r ∈ C.
Beside the theoretical interest of the problem, a practi-
cal application is error correction for Physical Unclonable
Functions (PUFs), which we will explain in Section V. A
construction of binary linear codes based on good LDPC
codes that fulfill the requirements stated in Problem 1 was
proposed by Mu¨elich and Bossert in [1]. By good, we
mean that the resulting code can be decoded well (e.g., its
Tanner graph has a large girth). In particular, this excludes
constructions that randomly choose low-weight parity checks
in the dual code of r. In this paper, we study two questions
which have not been addressed so far.
(P1) Calculation of P (∃C : r ∈ C), i.e., the probability that
such a construction is possible for a given r ∈ U(Fn2 ),
where U(Fn2 ) denotes the uniform distribution of all
vectors in Fn2 .
(P2) Calculation of H(r|C), i.e., the uncertainty of an at-
tacker who wants to recover r and knows the code
C. (The application in Section IV provides an example
where r can be interpreted as secret key.)
(P1) is studied in Section III. We show that under certain
assumptions the construction is possible with high probabil-
ity. Numerical results indicate that these assumptions are met.
(P2) is discussed in Section IV. We derive an analytic closed-
form expression of the uncertainty and show that if the code
construction is successful, we have k − 2 ≤ H(r | C) ≤ k.
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II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Code Construction
The code construction solving Problem 1 which was
proposed in [1] is based on LDPC codes [6]. LDPC codes
are constructed by generating a parity check matrix of low
density. Let H(I) be a low-density mH(I)×n matrix of rank
rkH(I) , where mH(I) is allowed to be larger than rkH(I) .
H(I) can be interpreted as a decoding matrix of an LDPC
code of length n and dimension n − rkH(I) . Assume H(I)
is given, below (cf. Section II-B) we describe how to obtain
H(I). Table I shows for three examples how much larger
mH(I) can be compared to rkH(I) .
n k mH(I) rkH(I)
128 13 881 115
128 56 349 72
256 106 555 150
TABLE I
CODE EXAMPLES [1].
The aim is to find an LDPC code C such that r ∈ C, where
r ∈ U(Fn2 ) is given. Algorithm 1 summarizes the method
from [1] for constructing a convenient decoding matrix H
from r and H(I): Since we want to have r ∈ C, it is required
that HrT = 0, and hence hirT = 0 for all rows hi of H .
We select the rows hi from the matrix H(I) for which this
condition is fulfilled, i.e., the rows which are orthogonal1 to
r, and use them to construct the decoding matrix H we are
aiming for. We require that k = dim(C) ≥ H(r|C). Hence
H should have at most rank n − H(r|C). While adding
parity check equations to H , the rank of the matrix increases,
and hence the dimension k decreases. We stop the process,
when H has a desired dimension k in order to be flexible
in adjusting the code rate of the final LDPC code.
B. How to get a decoding matrix H(I)
In Section II-A it was assumed that H(I) is given. This
section discusses how H(I) can be constructed. In [1],
the rows of H(I) were chosen as the union of rows of
different decoding matrices H(I)i of various constructions
of LDPC codes Ci of length n (Euclidean and Projective
Geometries [2], and Reed–Solomon based [3] LDPC codes).
As described in Section II-A, we are only interested in parity
check equations that are orthogonal to r. In general, the
error correction performance of a code decreases when the
1In coding theory often the term dual is used instead of orthogonal. In
this work these two terms are exchangeable.
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Algorithm 1: LDPC code construction algorithm [1]
Input: Vector r ∈ Fn2 , dec. matrix H(I) with mH(I)
rows
Output: Decoding matrix H of a code C(n, k), such
that r ∈ C
1 H is matrix with n columns and 0 rows.
2 for i = 1, 2, . . . ,mH(I) do
3 if i-th row hi of H(I) is orthogonal to r then
4 Vertically append hi to H .
5 return H
number of parity check equations decreases. Hence, if we use
only one LDPC construction method and take the appropriate
rows from the corresponding parity check matrix, we result
in a weak error correction performance. Thus, to increase
the number of errors that can be corrected, it is necessary
to extend the number of parity check equations what can be
done by combining selected rows of several LDPC parity
check matrices.
C. Notation
Let V ⊆ Fn2 be a subspace. Then,
OC(V) := {u ∈ Fn2 : uvT = 0 ∀v ∈ V}
with dim(OC (V)) = n − dim(V) is the orthogonal com-
plement of V . Let H be a matrix with row space 〈H〉. For
convenience, we write OC(H) := OC (〈H〉). In coding
theory, the orthogonal complement of a code is often called
dual code. A parity check matrix of a linear code C is a basis
of OC(C). Any other H whose rows span OC(C) is called
decoding matrix.
III. SUCCESSFUL CODE CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section, we would like to analyze for which
vectors r it is possible to construct an LDPC code C of
sufficiently small dimension k that contains r as codeword.
For instance, if k should be at most kmax, we need output
H of Algorithm 1 to have at least rank n− kmax.
A. Theoretical Ideas
Let hi be the i-th row of H(I). The probability of hi
being orthogonal to r depends on the number of ones in the
positions of r which are indexed by the support of hi. Since
r ∼ U(Fn2 ), it follows that
Pr
(
r · hTi = 0
)
=
1
2
.
Due to sparsity, the support of two distinct rows hi 6= hj
of H(I) is unlikely to overlap. In case of an overlap, it only
concerns a small number of positions. Therefore, we assume
that the events r ·hTi = 0 are statistically independent. Thus,
the number of rows mH of H is binomially distributed with
parameters mH(I) and
1
2 , i.e., mH ∼ Bin(mH(I) , 12 ). We will
show in Section III-B that this can be verified for practical
examples.
We can thus conclude that if the decoding matrix H(I)
contains many more rows than its rank, i.e., mH(I) 
rkH(I) , then the probability of having less than rkH(I) rows
in H is negligible. Also, the rank of H fulfills
rank(H) ≥ rank(H(I))− 1
with large probability since the mH  rkH(I) rows of H
are very likely to contain a generating set of
V := 〈H(I)〉 ∩OC(r)
and
dim (V) = dim
(
〈H(I)〉
)
+ dim (OC (r))
− dim
(
〈H(I)〉+OC(r)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤n
≥ rank
(
H(I)
)
− 1.
B. Numerical Results
We verify the results in Section III-A in a practical sce-
nario. The example uses an (512, 139) Euclidean Geometry
code, whose decoding matrix H(I) has mH(I) = 4672
rows. We generated random vectors r ∼ U(Fn2 ) and used
Algorithm 1 to obtain a code with decoding matrix H con-
taining r. Using the results of Section III-A, the number of
rows mH should be approximately Bin(mH(I) = 4672, 0.5)
distributed. Figure 1 visualizes the empirical cdf (sample size
= 106) in comparison to the theoretical cdf.
2,200 2,220 2,240 2,260 2,280 2,300 2,320 2,340 2,360 2,380 2,400 2,420 2,440
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Number of rows mH of the ouput matrix H
(E
m
pi
ri
ca
l)
cd
f
of
m
H
Empirical cdf
Bin(4672, 0.5) cdf
Fig. 1. Comparison of the empirical cdf of the number of rows mH of
H with the cdf of a Bin(mH(I) , 0.5) distributed random variable. Sample
size 106, number of rows mH(I) = 4672 of H
(I).
It can be seen that the two curves almost coincide.
Estimated mean and variance of mH are µ̂ ≈ 2335.99
and σ̂2 ≈ 1169.49. This is close to the theoretical values
E(mH) =
m
H(I)
2 = 2336 and Var(mH) =
m
H(I)
4 = 1168.
In addition, it was also observed that rank(H) = 272 =
rank(H(I))−1 for all tested cases (sample size = 103 due to
larger complexity of rank computation), which also coincides
with the theoretical prediction.
IV. ENTROPY DISCUSSION
Assume r is a secret that should be hidden from an
attacker that knows the code C. This is, for instance, the case
in the application presented in Section V. Since the code C
contains 2k codewords, including r, the uncertainty of r for
an attacker is at most k. In this section, we derive a lower
bound on the uncertainty and show that in most cases, it is
lower-bounded by k − 2.
A. Uncertainty of an Attacker
Let H(I) denote the original decoding matrix and H˜ be
the rows of H(I) that are orthogonal to r and H be the other
rows. The “attack” described above, which uses the fact that
r is a codeword of C, or in other words
r ∈ C := OC
(
H˜
)
, (1)
is suboptimal since it does not make use of H . We can in
addition use the latter by the following observation:
r ∈
mH⋂
i=1
Vi, (2)
where Vi := Fn2 \ OC(hi) with the i-th row hi of H . By
combining Equations (1) and (2), we obtain
r ∈ C ∩
(mH⋂
i=1
Vi
)
=: S.
The uncertainty of an attacker H(r|C) about r is directly
determined by the size of S. More precisely, since r ∈
U(Fn2 ), the uncertainty is lower-bounded by
H(r|C) ≥ log2(|S|).
We use Theorem 1 to derive a lower bound on H(r|C).
Theorem 1 A response r fulfills Conditions (1) and (2) if
and only if r′ ∈ OC (H ′), where
r′ := [r, 1] ∈ Fn+12 ,
H ′ :=
[
H˜ 0m
H˜
×1
H 1mH×1
]
∈ F(mH˜+mH)×(n+1)2 .
Proof: Condition (1) is fulfilled if and only if
hi · rT = 0 ∀i,
where hi is the i-th row of H˜ . This again holds if and only
if
[hi, 0] · [r, 1]T = 0 ∀i,
where [hi, 0] is the i-th row of
[
H˜ 0m
H˜
×1
]
, which means
that [r, 1] is in the right kernel of
[
H˜ 0m
H˜
×1
]
. Similarly,
Condition (2) is satisfied if and only if
hi · rT = 1 ∀i,
where hi is the i-th row of H . This implies that
[hi, 1] · [r, 1]T = 0 ∀i, where [hi, 1] is the i-th row of[
H 1mH×1
]
, which means that [r, 1] is in the right kernel
of
[
H 1mH×1
]
. Since the rows of
[
H˜ 0m
H˜
×1
]
and[
H 1mH×1
]
are exactly those of H ′, we get that the
conditions are fulfilled if and only if [r, 1] is in the right
kernel of H ′.
Using the statement of Theorem 1, the cardinality of
log2(|S|), and therefore a lower bound on the attacker’s
uncertainty about r, is directly determined by the rank of
the matrix H ′ in the following way.
Corollary 1 H(r|C) ≥ n− rank (H ′).
Proof: Using the rank nullity theorem (∗), we get
log2(|S|) = dim
(
OC
(
H ′
))− 1
(∗)
= (n+ 1)− rank (H ′)− 1
= n− rank (H ′) ,
which proves the claim.
Since the matrix H ′ is directly known after constructing C,
Corollary 1 provides a tool to determine a lower bound on the
uncertainty of the attacker. We will see in the next subsection
that log2(|S|) is at least k − 2 with large probability, where
k is the dimension of C.
B. Practical Considerations
In Section IV-A, we have derived a lower bound on an
attacker’s uncertainty about r which only depends on the
rank of the matrix H ′. The following theorem shows that
this rank is sufficiently small for the case of a successful
code construction, i.e., rank(H˜) ≥ rank(H(I))− 1.
Theorem 2 If rank(H˜) ≥ rank(H(I)) − 1 then
rank(H ′) ≤ rank(H˜) + 2.
Proof: Due to rank(H˜) ≥ rank(H(I))− 1, we get
dim
(
〈H˜〉 ∩ 〈H〉
)
= rank
(
H˜
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ rank(H(I))−1
+ rank
(
H
)− dim(〈H˜〉+ 〈H〉)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=rank(H(I))
≥ rank (H)− 1.
Hence, since 〈H˜〉∩〈H〉 is a subspace of 〈H〉 of dimension
at least rank
(
H
)− 1, the vector space 〈H〉 is a direct sum
of the form
〈H〉 = 〈h〉+
(
〈H˜〉 ∩ 〈H〉
)
,
where h ∈ 〈H〉. This means that all rows of the lower half
of H ′, i.e.,
[
H 1mH×1
]
, are of the form
(i) [h+ h˜, 1], where h˜ is in the span of the rows of H˜ .
(ii) [h˜, 1], where h˜ is in the span of the rows of H˜ .
If there is at least one row h′1 = [h+ h˜
′
, 1] of type (i), then
all such rows are in the span of
[
H˜ 0m
H˜
×1
]
and h′1 since
[h+ h˜, 1] = [h+ h˜
′
, 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=h′1
+ [h˜− h˜′, 0].︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ 〈
[
H˜ 0m
H˜
×1
]
〉
A similar argument holds for rows of type (ii), if there is
one such row h′2.
Hence, the rows of H ′ are spanned by the rows of the
matrix 〈
[
H˜ 0m
H˜
×1
]
〉 and h′1 and h′2 and its rank is
rank
(
H ′
) ≤ rank([H˜ 0m
H˜
×1
])
+ 2 = rank
(
H˜
)
+ 2,
which proves the claim.
Thus, in the case of a successful code construction, by
Corollary 1, the uncertainty of the attacker about the vector
r is lower-bounded as follows.
Corollary 2 If rank(H˜) ≥ rank(H(I))− 1, then H(r|C) ≥
k − 2.
Recall that we have shown in Section III, that the as-
sumption rank(H˜) ≥ rank(H(I)) − 1 is fulfilled with
high probability and therefore, with high probability, we get
H(r|C) ≥ k − 2.
V. APPLICATION: PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE
FUNCTIONS (PUFS)
The problem discussed in this paper can be found in the
context of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), devices
that can be used for cryptographic purposes like identifi-
cation, authentication and secure key generation. A PUF
extracts a unique and reproducible sequence of bits, which is
called response, from an integrated circuit. The uniqueness
results from randomness which is intrinsic to each device,
due to technical and physical variations within the manufac-
turing process. Since these variations cannot be controlled
by the manufacturer, devices which exploit this behavior are
called physically unclonable, since the behavior cannot be
cloned. Usually either the delay behavior of a device (e.g.
Ring-Oscillator PUFs [7]) or the initialization behavior of
memory cells (e.g. SRAM PUFs [8]) is used in order to
extract responses. An extracted response can for example be
used as cryptographic key due to its uniqueness.
One of the major advantages of using PUFs for key
generation is, that there is no need to store the key in a non-
volatile memory, since it can be simply reproduced when it is
needed by the cryptosystem. Storing a key in a non-volatile
memory makes a system vulnerable to physical attacks, even
when a protected memory is used. Due to measurement
noise or environmental conditions like temperature, supply
voltage or aging of the chip, errors occur when the response
is repeatedly extracted. For this reason, error correction
within a so-called helper data algorithm is needed. For
comprehensive details regarding different PUF constructions
we refer to the literature [9], [10], [12].
A. Existing Helper Data Algorithms
Different helper data algorithms have been proposed in the
literature. The most popular ones are Code-Offset Construc-
tion and Syndrome Construction [4], [5]. Both have in com-
mon, that an error correcting code as well as additional helper
data are required in order to reproduce a PUF response.
Helper data algorithms consist of two phases, initialization
phase and reproduction phase. In the initialization phase,
helper data are extracted from an initial PUF response. This
phase is performed only once within a secure environment
during the manufacturing process of the device. In the
reproduction phase, these helper data are used in order to
reproduce the initial response from a regenerated, erroneous
response. The reproduction phase occurs in field whenever
the cryptosystem needs access to the key.
We describe the Code-Offset Construction according to
the literature [4], [5], which is visualized in Figure 2. In
the initialization phase of the Code-Offset Construction, a
codeword c from a specified code C is randomly chosen and
added bitwise to the initial response r. The model assumes
that r ∼ U(Fn2 ). The bit sequence h which is obtained by this
operation is stored as helper data in a non-volatile, possibly
non-protected helper data storage. In the reproduction phase,
which is executed in the field as often as the cryptosystem
needs the key, the helper data h are added to a new extracted
response r′ in a pre-processing step of the error correction.
The result of this operation has the form c+ e where e is a
vector of low weight and hence can be interpreted as error
vector. A decoder for the chosen code can be used in order to
calculate c. Adding again the helper data h to c yields the
initial response r which was extracted in the initialization
phase.
PUF
r
r′ = r ⊕ e
= c⊕ h⊕ e
Helper
Data
Generation
c ∈R C
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h C
Pre–
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= c⊕ e
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Initialization
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Fig. 2. Code-Offset Construction [4], [5] for generating helper data.
B. New Helper Data Algorithm by Mu¨elich and Bossert
Recently, a scheme which only uses a code without
additional helper data was proposed in [1]. The main idea
of that new scheme, which is visualized in Figure 3, is to
construct a code C, such that the initial PUF response r
directly is a codeword of C. Note, that here Problem 1 occurs.
The code construction is executed in the initialization phase
of the scheme and was discussed in detail in Section II-
A. The response r′, which is extracted in the reproduction
phase, slightly differs from the initial response r and hence
can be described as r′ = r+e, where e is again a vector of
low weight. If a decoder for the constructed code C is used,
r can be recovered by simply decoding r′ (cf. Algorithm 2).
PUF
r
r′ = r ⊕ e
Helper
Data
Generation
Construct Code C
such that r ∈ C
C
Helper
Data
Storage
C
r′
Decoder
rˆ = dec(r′)
rˆ Key
Initialization
Reproduction
Fig. 3. Scheme according to [1].
Algorithm 1 which has been stated in Section II-A can
directly be used for the initialization phase of the Helper Data
Algorithm proposed in [1], while Algorithm 2 summarizes
the corresponding reproduction phase. Note, that if the
uncertainty is too low, the PUF can be removed from the
set of suitable PUFs. This is no problem since it is done
during the manufacturing process.
Algorithm 2: Helper Data Algorithm: Reproduction
phase [1]
Input: Re-extracted PUF response
r = rI + e ∈ {0, 1}n, H
Output: Decoding result rˆ = dec(r,H)
1 rˆ = dec(r,H)
2 return rˆ
C. Comparison to Existing Schemes
The essential difference between the new helper data
algorithm and previous ones is that only a code is needed,
but no further helper data are required. Of course, this can
only be advantageous in PUF applications that do not use a
challenge-response behavior. However, there are many appli-
cations in which this requirement is met. This, for instance,
includes Physical Obfuscated Keys (POKs) [15]. Another
application of PUFs with a single response is identification,
where the response serves a unique identifier of a device, e.g.,
[13].2 In these cases, the new scheme is interesting since:
1) There is less potential for side-channel attacks which
aim on helper data, e.g. the attack described in [11,
Section 5.2] is not applicable with that scheme.
2) Processing cost in the reproduction phase is reduced,
i.e., there is no need for an additional pre-processing
step before decoding (cf. Figures 2 and 3). Also this
allows a smaller implementation, which is essential in
2It is not suited for an authentication protocol as, e.g., described in [14],
since this would require to generate and store a code for each possible
challenge.
PUF applications as they are usually implemented on
rather limited hardware.
3) The amount of helper data is reduced in comparison to
other methods based on LDPC codes.
Moreover, it is a conceptual new method in comparison to
existing schemes. Besides PUFs, we belief that the problem
also is interesting for other applications.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work discussed the problem of constructing a code
such that a given binary vector is included as codeword.
We discussed open questions about constructability and the
security level of an LDPC code construction proposed in
[1]. The results of this work essentially imply two insights:
First, the code construction is possible with high probability
for desired code length and dimension. Second, the security
level is known and sufficiently large when the dimension k
of the code is chosen as k ≥ H(r|C)+2. Using these results,
we have shown the practicability of the helper data scheme
introduced in [1]. It is of further interest, which other code
classes can be used in order to solve the stated problem and
whether more applications which contain the stated problem
can be identified.
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